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Book Note

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW, by Gregory Klass,
George Letsas & Prince Saprai (eds)1
KENDALL GRANT
RECENT YEARS HAVE WITNESSED a revitalization of interest in the philosophical

study of contract law. Driven by the “contract and promise debate” introduced
in 1981, this new collection of essays combines work by leading philosophers,
contract lawyers, and legal theorists to provide a comprehensive snapshot of
contemporary scholarship on the topic and a roadmap for future research.
Part one, comprised of the first eleven essays, presents several theoretical
approaches and focuses on general questions related to moral and political theory,
conceptual analysis, sociological theory, empirical psychology, and economic
analysis. Charles Fried expands on his groundbreaking original work2 and
defends contract as a moral3 institution dependent on trust and a “recursive and
transparent mirroring of mutual recognition and respect.”4 Next, Randy Barnett
proposes an alternative model of “contract as consent” that applies no matter

1.
2.
3.
4.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 416 pages.
Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1981).
For Fried’s recent explanation of morality, see Charles Fried, “The Convergence of Contract
and Promise” (2007) 120:1 Harv L Rev F 1 at 2-3.
Supra note 1 at 21.

683

(2015) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

what the moral relationship5 between the parties, thereby encompassing the
default rules of contract.6
Joseph Raz and David Owens then consider the normative position of the
promisee. Raz explains that a promise gives the promisor a reason to perform
because of the “normative assurance” it provides; the value of that assurance, and
thus its associated strength, varies with each promise.7 For Owens, one cannot
deprive oneself of the dignity of control simply by declaration;8 promises rather
serve the promisee’s “authority interest.”9
Dori Kimel signals caution with respect to the “risky business” of strict
promissory obligations given the potential for breach and its impact on the
promisor’s autonomy. However, because promises are typically exchanged
in relationships that “generate a wealth of relationship-specific norms,”10 the
resulting moral obligations on the promisee may release the promisor from the
promise, therefore reducing the “threat” of promising.
Some hold that contractual obligations are moral obligations but are
not promissory in nature.11 James Penner contends that contracts should be
understood as involving agreements rather than promises: promises are unilateral
undertakings, while contracts are bilateral exchanges built on trust.12 On the other
hand, Charlie Webb allows that contracts give rise to promissory obligations, but
is not convinced that the promise is the reason for legal enforcement.13 Webb
urges that inquiry into the philosophical foundations of contract law “need
neither begin nor end with an account of promissory obligations.”14

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

For a more skeptical account of morality, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “The Divergence of
Contract and Promise” (2007) 120:3 Harv L Rev 708.
Supra note 1 at 52-55.
Ibid at 76.
For a full discussion of choice and consent, including a formulation of Hume’s Point, see
David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Supra note 1 at 89.
Ibid at 110.
For a rejection of contract as promise and a thought experiment which recounts the
possibility of undertaking contractual obligations while abjuring promissory ones, see
Michael G Pratt, “Contract: Not Promise” (2008) 35:4 Fla St U L Rev 801.
Supra note 1 at 119-20.
Similarly, the assumption of a legal obligation in the context of a contract need not inevitably
mean the assumption of a moral obligation. See e.g. Gregory Klass, “Promise Etc.” (2012)
45:3 Suffolk U L Rev 695.
Supra note 1 at 150.
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Liam Murphy identifies three functions that contract law might play: (1)
it might enforce the first-order moral obligation to perform, as per Fried; (2) it
might enforce second-order obligations post-breach; or (3) it might be deployed
instrumentally. Murphy adopts an inclusive hypothesis: contract law “supports
and shapes the social practice of making and keeping promises and agreements.”15
Avery Katz applies economic analysis to freedom of contract, interpretation,16
and damages.17 Due to their respective interests in maximizing efficiency gain and
anticipating private activity, adjudicators, legislators, and contractors will find
special value in the economic approach to contract law.18 Lastly, Aditi Bagchi
asserts that not only should distributive injustices inform contract law’s approach
to legal enforcement, but “some of the background duties that infuse contract are
derivative from principles of distributive justice.”19
Part two, consisting of the final seven essays, delves into specific doctrinal
questions of contract law. Margaret Jane Radin tackles take-it-or-leave-it contracts
between unsophisticated parties. Finding that the only mechanism for enforcing
such agreements—the doctrine of unconscionability—is unsatisfactory, Radin
suggests a nonformalist framework for determining when to enforce boilerplate
terms.20 Lisa Bernstein, by contrast, criticizes courts’ willingness to give legal effect
to customary business norms, as well as their use of “context evidence,” on the basis
that it deters flexibility21 and increases transaction costs for sophisticated parties.22
Daniel Markovits equates the duty of good faith with performance itself,23 and
elaborates a theory that explains good faith as an attitude of reciprocal recognition,
a foundation of contract as “collaboration.”24 In response, Mindy Chen-Wishart
addresses the nature of vitiating factors in contract law and proposes both an
15. Ibid at 169 [emphasis added].
16. See generally Richard A Posner, “The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation” (2005)
83:6 Tex L Rev 1581.
17. Supra note 1 at 183-86.
18. Economic accounts, like consent theories, treat contract as a legal analog to the morality of
promising. See Eric A Posner, “Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:
Success or Failure?” (2003) 112:4 Yale LJ 829.
19. Supra note 1 at 199.
20. Ibid at 236-37.
21. For a case in favour of the more flexible “contracting for innovation,” see Ronald J Gilson,
Charles F Sabel & Robert E Scott, “Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration” (2009) 109:3 Colum L Rev 431.
22. Supra note 1 at 258.
23. Ibid at 272 [emphasis in original].
24. For Markovits’ submission that contracts generate, as opposed to promises, a distinctive
form of moral relationship, see Daniel Markovits, “Contract and Collaboration” (2004)
113:7 Yale LJ 1417.
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enlarged conception of consent as well as a “two-step defeasibility approach” to
legal rules that moves beyond contract as “merely” consent.25
George Letsas and Prince Saprai return to trust as the defining characteristic
of contractual relationships. In their view, the making of a promise triggers
“altruistic duties of assistance, over and above the duty to perform.”26
Exemplifying a Commonwealth tradition of interpretive legal analysis that
aims to uncover the law’s immanent logic, Stephen Smith finds that it is not
breach of duty, but compensation for wrongdoing, that explains damage awards:
“damages are the private law equivalent of punishment.”27 Finally, Gregory Klass
recounts the well-known theory of efficient breach and offers an updated, more
sophisticated version that reveals three features of contract law often overlooked
by noneconomic theories.28
Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law is an ambitious undertaking,
with extensive coverage of the major theories and debates surrounding this
commanding area of law. If, in its commendable efforts, it fails to engage
with Hegelian, Aristotelian, corrective justice, or civil recourse theories,29 or
with attempts to apply behavioural economics to contract law,30 it nonetheless
represents a worthwhile and stimulating contribution to the literature.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Supra note 1 at 312-14.
Ibid at 325-26.
Ibid at 356.
Ibid at 363.
See e.g. Ernest J Weinrib, “Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies” (2003)
78:1 Chi-Kent L Rev 55; Nathan B Oman, “Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse
Theory of Contractual Liability” (2011) 96:2 Iowa L Rev 529.
30. See e.g. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A Hoffman, “Breach Is For Suckers” (2010) 63:4
Vand L Rev 1001.

